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A New View of Intergenerational Justice
H. Steven Green
Abstract
　This essay proposes to view justice across generations as a trust instead of as a type 
of social contract. Despite popular notions of a “generational contract”, the concept, 
once examined, raises vexing questions about the meanings of terms we may have 
thought we could take for granted. The issue of intergenerational justice is a challenge 
even to frame, because it forces us to consider the utility of describing rights and duties 
across generations as a “contract.” Discussion here is confined primarily to the topics of 
state-mandated pensions for the aged and secondarily to what is owed to people not yet 
born. The essay argues that a trust fund is a better instrument for securing justice across 
generations than is social contract doctrine.
　This paper will proceed as follows. First, it will draw on the work of Peter Laslett to 
examine whether and how we may conceive of justice across generations. As per Las-
lett’s argument, the essay will suggest that the notion of an intergenerational contract 
be replaced with that of a trust. Next, the paper will review the topic of justice across 
generations as discussed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. Finally, it will review 
arguments of Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia as well as of Richard A. Ep-
stein and demonstrate that, in James S. Fishkin’s words, “The limits of intergenerational 
justice” reveal that social contract docrtine “is a form of intuitionism.”（ 1 ）
（ 1 ）　James Fishkin, “The Limits of Intergenerational Justice,” in James Fishkin （ed.） and Peter Laslett （ed.）, 
Philosophy, Politics & Society: Volume 6, Justice Between Age Groups and Generations （New Haven: Yale 
UP, 1992）, pp. 62⊖63
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A New View of Inter-Generational Justice
　The following short passage from Edmund Burke’s Reflections raises important 
questions about democracy and the relation of duties and rights to time:
“You will observe that, from the Magna Carta to the Declaration of Right, it 
has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties, 
as an entailed inheritance delivered to us from our forefathers, and to be trans-
mitted to our prosperity…”（ 2 ）（Emphasis in original.）
　In this quote, Burke “place［s］ liberty in a stable role.”（ 3 ） In fact, it resembles a tan-
gible object. “By a constitutional policy working after the pattern of nature,” he contin-
ues, “we receive, we hold, we transmit our government and our privileges, in the same 
manner in which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives.”（ 4 ） In this vision, 
liberty is implied to possess the same qualities of permanence and solidity as a family 
heirloom or an acre of land.
　Burke, in particular, and conservative thinkers, in general, emphasize the preserva-
tion of particular institutions and traditions and reject “innovation” as “the result of a 
selfish temper.”（ 5 ） But, the act of transmission itself may be innovative in as much as it 
intends for the young and those not yet born to conform to their predecessors’ notion of 
justice. Just as the condition, nature and value of the land my son inherits from me in-
（ 1 ）　James Fishkin, “The Limits of Intergenerational Justice,” in James Fishkin （ed.） and Peter Laslett （ed.）, 
Philosophy, Politics & Society: Volume 6, Justice Between Age Groups and Generations （New Haven: Yale 
UP, 1992）, pp. 62⊖63
（ 2 ）　Edmund Burke, Reflections （Works, Rivington Edition, Vol. V, pp.59⊖60, 77⊖81）, cited in Russel Kirk, 
ed. The Portable Conservative Reader （New York, NY: Penquin Books, Ltd., 1982）, p.11
（ 3 ）　Fishkin, p.62
（ 4 ）　Ibid., p.12
（ 5 ）　Ibid., p.11
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fluences what he can do with it, how society conceives of liberty now determines how 
future generations interpret and use their liberty.
　In the welfare state we make allowances for age differences. We permit the state to 
determine the years in which adulthood and old age commence. Legislators use the lat-
ter to demarcate the specific moment when citizens become entitled to new rights, e.g. 
the right to a retirement pension. Furthermore, the fact that we expect our constitution 
to bind future citizens demonstrates we expect the rights and duties within it to be ap-
plicable to them, regardless of the fact that we cannot know what our descendants will 
want.
　Today’s wealthy welfare state democracies contain more senior citizens than work-
ers. Those in the workforce right now face cuts in their expected retirement benefits 
and wonder if they may not outlive their countryʼs pension system. Every citizen has a 
personal stake in the pension system, as contributions are mandatory and benefits uni-
versal. Declining fertility rates and rising aged-dependency rates –the ratio of retirees 
to workers – in the advanced democracies have created a demographic challenge that 
imperils the sustainability of national pension systems. Given the popularity of these 
programs, plus the fact that older people vote in high numbers, politicians may be re-
luctant to reduce benefits.
　Government pension fund managers must figure out how to get more contributions 
out of a shrinking workforce, even as they may have to tax it at higher rates to pay for 
old-age pensions. This dismal calculation generates the potential for conflict across age 
groups: retirees who expect a return on their life-long payments versus contemporary 
workers who balk at paying more now for less later.
　In the wealthy democracies pension benefits for senior citizens are designed with an 
understanding that the liberty of the elderly is for naught if they cannot maintain a cer-
tain level of well-being after leaving the workforce. Meeting these obligations now 
certainly affects the choices of the current working and of future generations. Are the 
rules for fulfilling these duties an abridgement or an enhancement of liberty?　Among 
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the EU’s ten principles for pension reform are these four: Ensure that all older people 
enjoy a decent living standard and are able to participate in public, social and cultural 
life; Provide access to all individuals to appropriate pension arrangements; Achieve a 
high level of employment so that the ratio between the active and the retired remains as 
favorable as possible; Ensure that public spending on pensions is maintained at a level 
in terms of per cent of GDP that is compatible with the Growth and Stability Pact.（ 6 ） 
As these provisions indicate, given the stated aims of a pension program, it is impossi-
ble to maintain pension systems without state intervention in other facets of the econo-
my.
　Are we right to assume that a contract exists across generations, as part of a social 
contract?　Perhaps “intergenerational justice” is merely a convenient concept to justify 
politically popular income transfers to the elderly. David Hume insists that justice is a 
matter of convention, not of natural law, so the social contract has no authority trans-
cendent of our senses and our traditions. An examination of the generational relation-
ships assumed to form the foundation of the pension component of the welfare stateʼs 
social contract reveals, in Peter Laslettʼs words, “the notorious unrealism of contractari-
an thinking.”（ 7 ） I will review Laslett’s critique below.
　Framing the issue as one of a contract obscures the processional nature of the issue 
of rights and duties across generations. Politicians and policy analysts imagine a two-
generational procreative contract （hereafter referred to as “the 2-gpc”） when they refer 
to a generational contract. The 2-gpc is a useful heuristic to establish transfers between 
the working, those not yet working and the retired. The procreative nature of this con-
tract follows from the fact that the “actual procreators （though not necessarily all of 
their lateral kin） are universally prior in time to those they procreate as well as being 
（ 6 ）　John Myles, “A New Contract for the Elderly?” in Gǿsta Esping-Andersen, Duncan Gallie, Anton 
Hemerjick and John Myles, Why We Need a New Welfare State （Oxford; Oxford UP, 2002）, p.135, box 5．1
（ 7 ）　Peter Laslett, “Is There a Generational Contract?” in James Fishkin （ed.） and Peter Laslett （ed.）, 
Philosophy, Politics & Society: Volume 6, Justice Between Age Groups and Generations （New Haven: Yale 
UP, 1992）, p.25
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their generative originators.”（ 8 ） Laslett observes that the obvious metaphor to parental 
and filial relations is part of the 2-gpcʼs intuitive appeal. In return for having been nur-
tured to adulthood by their parents, children provide for those parents when they can 
no longer provide for themselves.
　I would argue further that the appeal to this metaphor lies in the fact it makes us feel 
we are recreating an idealized feature of the pre-modern extended family, in which 
people looked directly after their children and their parents under the same roof. Now, 
thanks to the wealth and freedom of movement generated by the economies of the 
wealthy democracies, we like to imagine we can do the same thing for our elders, and 
our children for us, but without having to share our homes or give up our freedom of 
movement.
　Laslett posits two reasons why this 2-gpc is an unsatisfactory point of departure for 
conceiving of intergenerational justice and I present an additional reason. First, as Las-
lett notes, imagining the relationship between parents and children as contractual, “in 
the mode of if-you-do-something-for-me-now-I-will-in-due-course-do-the-equivalent-
for- you” is “an absurdity.”（ 9 ） Not only is an unborn person incapable of making a con-
tract with her parents-to-be but, all that parents give to their children is given in an act 
of love, which, by definition, is free of obligation. The parent cannot bind the child to a 
set of duties to be performed later in life because the “benefits” distributed to the chil-
dren were unconditional acts of love. Nor are children bound to assist their parents later 
in life because of an implied contract.
　I see a second problem with the 2-gpc. It seems unlikely that anyone, in the United 
States for example, considers her mandatory deductions for social security as the ful-
fillment of a filial duty. Rather, people understand the 2-gpc as an analogy to a pre-
modern family structure in which families were responsible for their own. However, 
even as an analogy the 2-gpc fails to establish a principle for distributive justice across 
（ 8 ）　Ibid., p27
（ 9 ）　Ibid., p.29
東洋法学　第57巻第 １号（20１3年 7 月） 63
（450）
generations. Births and deaths among the population, i.e. demographic trends, obscure 
the notion of a contract. The size of each group changes daily with noticeable fluctua-
tions over time, such as the baby boom and the subsequent baby bust. These fluctua-
tions impact the contribution and benefit levels of workers and retirees so that any 
“contract” is regularly “renegotiated” albeit by third parties- elected legislators and une-
lected policy experts.
　The third problem, identified by Laslett, is that the 2-gpc applies only “between age-
groups sharing the same time space”（10） but cannot cover removed generations, i.e. obli-
gations between us and the unborn children of our children, or even between living 
grandparents and grandchildren. Of this latter relationship, Laslett notes, the best the 
2-gpc can offer is a procreative claim by the grandparent on the grandchild. In fact, 
some environmentalists do try to make this claim based on appeals to consider our 
grandchildrenʼs children, and their children, etc. Yet, so long as appeals to contractual 
relations are made, there is no good answer to the question, “Why should I do anything 
for future generations?　They have done nothing for me.”（11） In short, the notion of a 
contract across generations is actually a convention based on traditional notions of filial 
duty. However, the argument for a contract cannot apply to such a notion nor can it ex-
tend to cover removed generations.
　In fact, the idea of a contract across generations is actually a modern convention 
based on traditional notions of filial duty, and a flawed sense of the direction in which 
obligations may flow. If a contract binds us to those who were born ahead of us, then it 
must also bind us to those who are born after us, but, as noted, this obligation cannot 
be justified under contractarian thinking.
　On the other hand, if we emphasize both trust- as reliance on another’s word and 
character- and trusts- as a property managed by an agent for someone else- we may yet 
create a foundation for distributive justice across time. The welfare state bundles dif-
（10）　Ibid., p.28
（11）　Ibid.
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ferent age cohorts into three “distinct” generations and justice is assumed to flow 
“downward and upward from the parental generation, set in motion and regulated by 
the trust that subsists between the cohorts that constitute each of them.”（12） This trust is 
formed through communication by the entire population of the duties and rights inher-
ent in the contract to each individual, regardless of his or her age. Although Laslett 
does not emphasize this next point, I do: This communication of the terms of the “social 
contract” creates part of the national identity and a shared purpose based on observing 
that one’s fellow citizens hold their end of the bargain. Thus, when demographics, 
among other factors, threaten the arrangements of the contract, worry about a “coming 
generational storm” commences. However, trust within and across age groups is not the 
problem with the contract.
　At issue is that the so-called contract is actually a trust, managed by the state. As La-
slett explains, contributors and beneficiaries of pension funds “have been allowed to 
suppose that their rights and duties were indeed of the kind that the untenable two-gen-
erational procreative contract implies.”（13） In fact, the arrangement of pensions for sen-
ior citizens should be understood not as a contract but as a trust, in which “the State 
［has］ to be considered a further party.”（14） The state is not the intermediary who passes 
on our contributions to eligible retirees. Individuals of working age pay contributions 
to pension programs with the expectation that those who come next will do so also. 
The so-called generational contract, then, is not based upon the act “of one party repay-
ing another for benefits received earlier, which is why the transfer arrangement is more 
trustlike than contractlike.”（15） Furthermore, trustees- i.e. workers- are obligated to meet 
future demands for increased payments due to changes in the size of particular age co-
horts and fluctuations in the national economy. As manager of the trust, the state’s in-
（12）　Ibid., p.31
（13）　Ibid., p.35
（14）　Ibid., p.32
（15）　Ibid., p.33
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terest in it is to preserve it. Thus, the state’s primary objective will always be to do 
what is best for the expansion of the trust fund.
　How might a trust achieve justice for those not yet born?　I offer an incomplete 
sketch: By expanding its domain to include welfare programs in general to provide as-
sistance for those in need the trust could work much like the modern welfare state al-
ready does, but with a new understanding that it is a trust fund, not a social contract. 
The state’s actual role would be that of executor of a trust with an interest in preserving 
and expanding the trust. It is only through expansion that the trust can exist in perpetui-
ty.（16）
　As noted above, contractarian thinking fails to provide the basis for justice across re-
moved generations. On the other hand, the trust provides for future generations because 
of the processional nature of contributions to it. This same logic allows us to conceive 
of justice for removed generations. Duties in the pension trust fund do not flow upward 
in the generational order, from the young to the old. They flow along what Laslett iden-
tifies as an “Aristotelian nisus,” in which, “Duties point always forward in time and 
downward in the procreative succession, backward in the generational procession and 
rights always point in the opposite direction.”（17） By this same reasoning, I suggest we 
may posit both society and the territory of the state as trusts （or as a single trust, if so 
desired, as the former exists within the latter） for future generations. Although he an-
chors his claim in natural law, John Locke argues as much, namely “for he that leaves 
as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all.”（18） We may 
（16）　At this point, I concede that this proposal is vulnerable on at least two points. First, a critic might wonder 
how I imagine the state will raise the revenue for an expansion, considering that stateʼs already face 
opposition to raising taxes just to pay for current obligations. So, a critic might suggest I have offered 
nothing more than to put a new label on an old product.  At this point, my only answer is that I have shown 
the problems inherent in the contract doctrine, one of which is an unrealistic appeal to people to feel 
particular duties toward the not yet born.  My argument only goes so far, at this point, to suggest that 
emphasizing the processional nature of the trust fund better frames the issue.
（17）　Ibid., p.37
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ensure that we leave “as much as another can make use of” not only by monitoring our 
taking, but also by replacing what we took, for both of which we have incentives under 
the terms of the trust. The puzzle of achieving justice for removed generations resolves 
itself over time as each individual is inclined to maintain the preservation of enough in 
her society now so as to ensure enough will exist for her later in life as well. （This in-
clination may even be stronger among those with children and grandchildren, though I 
will not explore the matter here.）
　How does Rawls imagine justice across generations?　A Theory of Justice proceeds 
from belief in the utility of contract terminology. According to Rawls, “it conveys the 
idea that principles of justice may be conceived as principles that would be chosen by 
rational persons, and that in this way conceptions of justice may be explained and justi-
fied.”（19） Nothing in the previous section addresses the issue of equality across genera-
tions, yet equality is the central concern for Rawls. He argues that justice is inextrica-
bly linked to the basic structure of society, which includes constitutions, markets and 
property laws, and this structure “favor［s］ certain starting places over others…It is 
these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic structure of any society, to which 
the principles of social justice must in the first instance apply.”（20） Social inequality may 
be inevitable, but it is also artificial and, therefore, can be regulated or controlled. Find-
ing the best way to control inequality is the task Rawls assigns himself in A Theory of 
Justice. Rawls devotes 12 pages （Parts 44 and 45） to the topic of justice between gen-
erations. He addresses the issue of justice forward in time, for the inheritors of our po-
litical arrangements, but he does not address transfers from the working to the retired. I 
will review Rawls’s discussion of this topic and then consider how his claims might ap-
ply to the matter of pensions.
（18）　From John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, cited in Michael Cohen and Nicole Fermon, ed., 
Princeton Readings in Political Thought （Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1996）, p.252
（19）　John Rawls, A Theory of Justice （Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999）, pp. 14⊖15
（20）　Ibid., p.7
東洋法学　第57巻第 １号（20１3年 7 月） 67
（446）
　For Rawls, the problem of justice across generations commences with determining 
how to maintain the “social minimum”.（21） The difference principle requires that ine-
qualities of income and wealth may exist for so long as they assist the least well off in 
society, but, by itself, it does not suggest what minimal level of well being is tolerable. 
“Once the difference principle is accepted, however,” writes Rawls, “ it follows that the 
social minimum is set at “that point which, taking wages into account maximizes the 
expectations of the least advantaged group” （emphasis mine）.（22） Without the differ-
ence principle, the parties in the original position would be likely to choose an egalitar-
ian distribution upon the lifting of the veil of ignorance. Without the social minimum, 
however, the least well off would be likely to reject the terms of the social contract as 
unbearable. The social minimum would provide a tolerable level of well being for the 
least advantaged and, therefore, provide some reasonable expectation of raising their 
well being over time.
　However, Rawls emphasizes the “long-term prospects of the least favored extending 
over future generations.”（23） Preservation of the social minimum into the future is the 
duty of those living now and Rawls requires each generation to “put aside in each peri-
od of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation”（24） to ensure it by establish-
ing a just savings principle. The contract doctrine to which Rawls subscribes requires 
that the parties in the original position to adopt a just savings principle to ensure that 
savings will accumulate over generations. Each generation is required to make a contri-
bution to “those coming later and receives from its predecessors.”（25）
　Why would the parties in the original position choose to adopt the savings principle?　
After all, from behind the veil of ignorance they will have no way of knowing whether 
or not earlier generations will have saved. If not, then the savings principle would sure-
（21）　Ibid., p.252
（22）　Ibid., p. 244, 252
（23）　Ibid., p.252
（24）　Ibid.
（25）　Ibid.
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ly be a burden on economic growth. If so, then why would the parties want to negate 
the potential gains they receive from the savings of their predecessors?　Rawls’s theo-
ry bumps into the paradox of contractarian thinking discussed above. A contract re-
quires the willingness of two parties to accept obligations toward one another. Yet, be-
hind the veil of ignorance, the parties do not know to what obligations they may be 
beholden upon the lifting of the veil.
　Rawls tries to work around this issue with an appeal to genetic-based affection. He 
claims that we “assume first, that the parties represent family lines, say, who care at 
least about their more immediate descendents; and second, that the principle adopted 
must be such that they wish all earlier generations to have followed it.”（26） In order pre-
serve the contract doctrine, Rawls actually removes some of the ignorance behind the 
veil by assigning to each party an identity as parents, or at least a will to procreate. 
“Thus imagining themselves to be fathers, say, they are to ascertain how much they 
should set aside for their sons and grandsons by noting what they would believe them-
selves entitled to claim of their fathers and grandfathers.”（27） Surely, the assumption that 
one will be a parent upon lifting the veil affects the kind of distribution system that will 
follow, yet Rawls does not pursue this point in any detail.
　Rawls stipulates that the parties in the original position must devise a savings rate 
that does not violate the difference principle, and will contain a mechanism for adjust-
ments both within their lifetimes and beyond. The objectives of the accumulated sav-
ings are “a state of society with a material base sufficient to establish effective just in-
stitutions within which the basic liberties can all be realized” plus “the knowledge and 
culture, as well as the techniques and skills that make possible just institutions.”（28）
　Rawls considers justice only across removed generations but not across generations 
still living, i.e. across the young, the working and the retired. I propose to apply his 
（26）　Ibid., p.255
（27）　Ibid., p.256
（28）　Ibid., p.256
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ideas to the matter of justice-as-income-transfers to the aged. Rawls assumes the par-
ties in the original position will adopt the maximin rule- they will aim to obtain the 
best of all possible worst results, since they do not know what their position will be 
upon the lifting of the veil. The difference principle obliges them to accept only those 
inequalities that will improve the lot of the worst off.
　Would the parties in the original position consider the elderly among the least advan-
taged whose well-being must improve with that of the most advantaged?　Will the ba-
sic structure of the economy require the elderly to retire at a set age or will it allow peo-
ple to work as long as they are willing and able?　On the one hand, some people reach 
the age of 70 and higher with enough savings to guarantee a comfortable standard of 
living even if they live to be 100. Furthermore, many people who are a decade or more 
past the mandatory retirement age are capable of producing wealth. On the other hand, 
at some point around the age of 60 many people are not able, or not allowed, to remain 
in the workforce and, even if they have saved, they lack enough money to guarantee a 
comfortable standard of living for far into the future. How will these considerations af-
fect the decision of the parties in the original position?
　Becoming elderly is not a matter of birth, fate （acquiring cancer or another disease 
after birth） or accident. Most people expect to become elderly and intend to live as 
long as possible. Coming out of the original position some parties will find they are el-
derly but everyone will eventually become elderly. May we assume, then, that the par-
ties in the original position would make some provision for the well being of the elder-
ly?　I believe they would, certainly if they follow the maximin rule. If the parties are 
the cautious risk takers Rawls claims, then they would want to provide for their own 
well being in the event of illness or poor health due to old age including a subsequent 
loss of income.
　In fact, it is more likely that the parties would conceive of a safety net for the elderly 
before they would concern themselves with the just savings principle, because the for-
mer will affect their earnings and prospects more than the latter. It seems likely that the 
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parties in the original position would prioritize providing for the elderly over the sav-
ings principle so that this latter issue would have to be considered with the former. Fi-
nally, because the parties in the original position would have a stake in a pension sys-
tem, they do not need to adopt contract doctrine to conceive of it, but can establish the 
system as a trust. Therefore, Rawls does not need to attach the parties to the strings of 
familial associations in order to establish a system to provide justice over time. （How-
ever, because he does assign to them the expectation of parenthood, it is fair to ask 
whether or not the parties would design a system that leaves childcare solely in the 
hands of families or one that includes generous provisions for child care. Either deci-
sion affects the basic structure greatly.）
　Rawls conceives of justice across generations as a matter of ensuring that society 
preserve the means to make sure the difference principle is honored over time. To re-
main within the bounds of contract theory he stipulates that parties in the original posi-
tion possess the will to procreate, but the savings principle sounds less convincing than 
the notion of the trust described by Laslett. Laslett’s formulation does not require any 
procreational sentiments, though it certainly has room for them. Rather, its strength lies 
in the fact that individuals are expected to be motivated primarily by their own long-
term interests, which, when realized through the contributions of their peers, and along 
the procession of age cohorts, will allow the future to take care of itself, as it were. 
Rawls concludes Part 44 of A Theory of Justice with only the assertion that “The deri-
vation of these duties and obligations may seem at first a somewhat farfetched applica-
tion of the contract doctrine. Nevertheless these requirements would be acknowledged 
in the original position” but does not say why.（29）
　For classical liberals, the best means to achieve justice across generations rest in the 
hand of individuals and families, and not a public agency. If the state does not interfere 
with the individual’s natural inclinations toward both self-preservation and providing 
（29）　Ibid., p.258
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for one’s heirs, then, according to Richard A. Epstein, “the problem of future genera-
tions will pretty much take care of itself.”（30） The libertarian argument begins with Rob-
ert Nozick’s entitlement theory. Nozick argues that three rules “cover the subject of jus-
tice in holdings:
1 ．A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of jus-
tice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
2 ．A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle justice 
in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the hold-
ing.
3 ．No one is entitled to a holding except by （repeated） applications of 1 and 
2.”（31）
　In sum, Nozick argues that we may keep what we have acquired in fair exchanges 
with another consenting adult; we may keep what someone gives, sells or trades to us 
as long as the object of the transaction was acquired justly; these two rules govern ac-
quisition of all our holdings.
　Nozick’s concern is whether or not any distribution scheme is either end-result or 
historical and either patterned or unpatterned. The entitlement theory is historical and 
unpatterned; it requires no correlation of the distribution resulting from just acquisi-
tions and transfers with anything else, such as need or, for the sake of this argument, 
age. As long as the history of a distribution records transfers in accordance with the 
three principles of the entitlement theory, it is just.
　Nozick criticizes Rawls’s theory as an end-result theory. Because the parties in the 
original position must design a distribution to fit the difference principle, the distribu-
tion system will necessarily interfere with the entitlement theory. Put another way, 
Rawls’s theory tolerates forced takings of one personʼs property for the sake of another. 
End-result distributions threaten liberty because they prioritize the achievement of a 
（30）　Richard A. Epstein, “Justice Across Generations,” in Fishkin and Laslett, pp.84⊖85
（31）　Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia （Basic Books, 1974） p.151
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particular outcome over fair processes of acquisition; what is mine under the entitle-
ment theory, may be appropriated under an end-result distribution scheme. Ownership 
involves the liberty to give things to other people, but the pattern theories threaten the 
right of possession. “The view that holding must be patterned perhaps will seem less 
plausible when it is seen to have the consequence that people may not choose to do 
acts that upset the patterning, even with things they legitimately hold.”（32）
　It follows from a rejection of patterned distributions that Nozick also rejects the idea 
of any central distributor, since “things come into existence already held （or with 
agreements already made about how they are to be held）, there is no need to search for 
some pattern for unheld holdings to fit; and since the process whereby holdings actual-
ly come into being or are shaped, itself needn’t realize any particular pattern, there is 
no reason to expect any pattern to result…there is no separate process of distribution 
for a theory of distribution to be a theory.”（33） Attempts to reduce inequalities require 
forced transfers of wealth, which violate the entitlement theory. “Taxation of earnings 
from labor is on a par with forced labor,”（34） so redistributive policies by the state are 
unjust. The welfare state programs place an ownership right in others by allowing the 
poor to claim a portion of their earnings. This appropriation is called part of the “social 
contract” but Nozick sees nothing contractual in it: the parties have not entered freely 
into it, they do not know each other, and they may not opt out of it.
　Nozick does not address the issue of intergenerational justice, except on the matter 
of rectification for past injustices, which would be any violations of the entitlement 
theory. In this instance, he allows that Rawls’s difference principle or even a welfare 
program may be the best means to rectify past injustices.（35） Nozickʼs libertarianism dis-
misses any obligations to future generations beyond the duty of the living to honor the 
three principles in the entitlement theory.
（32）　Ibid., p.219
（33）　Ibid
（34）　Ibid., p.169
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　How might we apply Nozick’s libertarianism to the issue of distributive justice and 
the elderly?　Certainly it supports privately managed pension funds. The free, volun-
tary nature of the exchange between an investor and a fund manager is clear. So, man-
datory participation in state pension programs must violate our liberty, as a specific ex-
ample of the “forced labor” that taxation is. At first cut, the entitlement theory seems to 
rule out any tax-financed pension program for its own sake, that is merely to offer a 
guaranteed minimum income for those too old to work. The four EU guidelines for 
member nations’ pension programs listed above demonstrate the complex relation be-
tween pension funding schemes and employment. From the forced removal of people 
from the workforce at a particular age, to the takings of a portion of earned incomes, 
and including the provision that the state cannot guarantee benefit levels without ad-
justing both the level of takings upward more earnings and the retirement age these 
programs seem to commit numerous violations of the entitlement principles.
　Richard A. Epstein considers the matter of old-age pensions from the perspective of 
how an individual adjusts her actions now based on expectations and uncertainty for 
her own future. Individuals discount future costs and benefits based on present values, 
and the calculation hinges on how much labor and how much consumption to defer 
now for a future gain. “There are good reasons why most people keep their pension 
funds in liquid and tradeable assets.”（36） Individuals want flexibility in the distribution 
of their assets over time. The libertarian assumes an individual can anticipate her future 
needs better than someone else, if for no other reason than the latter simply cannot 
have enough information to regulate others’ choices. Obviously, libertarians like Ep-
stein would support private funds for old age pensions, rather than state-mandated and 
managed. An individual can more directly influence his private fund manager （say, 
through discussions about potential changes in a portfolio） than he can a state bureau-
crat who manages everyone’s pension fund, and he can retain flexibility in expectations 
（35）　Ibid., pp.230⊖231
（36）　Ibid,, p.89
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over time. For the libertarian, the issue of justice upward in the generational order is 
moot: individuals are best left to invest for their own age.
　But, asks Epstein, “What happens when the future belongs to different people in a 
different generation?”（37） He rejects the “collective determination” undertaken to find 
the just savings principle in Rawls’s original position because it “insists that the tempo-
ral priority of the present yields no moral priority for people alive in the present.”（38） Ep-
stein challenges the notion of a duty toward future generations on the grounds that it 
constrains the rights of the living. The obligation of the living toward the not yet born 
will be based on moral claims, but also and “more important for these purposes, legal 
constraint.”（39） Epstein makes the same argument against regulations designed to dis-
tribute benefits into the future as libertarians do against the argument for a planned 
economy: “The use of collective coercion has to be carefully husbanded lest it do more 
harm than good.”（40） Finally, he makes the same claim as does Burke that if society pre-
serves sound institutions of the present “then the problem of future generations will 
pretty much take care of itself.”（41）
　Epstein argues that posing a conflict between present and future generations presup-
poses we know what both the living and the unborn want. Yet, even it were possible to 
understand what those alive right now desire, the further we try to look into the future 
of their lifetimes, the less reliable our predictions about their future desires become. 
Epstein proposes that individuals do not seek to maximize their individual utilities, “but 
instead have heavily interdependent utility functions with their offspring.”（42） Epstein 
argues that “genetic connection,” not disinterested benevolence, is the grease in the 
wheels of inter-generational justice. Parentsʼ desire to ensure the best future possible 
for their offspring provides an inherent bias for the future in any generation. “A wise 
（37）　Ibid.
（38）　Epstein, p. 84
（39）　Ibid., p. 85
（40）　Ibid.
（41）　Ibid.
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social system,” he suggests, “will exploit what nature has given us in an effort to span 
the generations.”（43） 
　If parents know the wealth they’ve accumulated over their lifetimes is going to their 
children when they die, then they will limit their consumption in old age. However, if 
they know it is going to strangers, they will consume more before they die. Inheritance 
taxes try to strike the balance between these two incentives. The effects of these possi-
bilities on distributive justice across generations are clear: Family inheritances pass on 
wealth to the future and, as Epstein argues, “the problem takes care of itself ” over time 
with each generation’s passing. If the state outlaws inheritance, then parents will spend 
more in their lifetimes and pass on less to the future generation. Epstein claims that 
modern estate taxes do not destroy the transfer of wealth but have inhibited it. He 
leaves the matter of direct transfers to future generations in the hands of families, in 
contrast to Rawls who, while assigning the status of parenthood to the parties in the 
original position, actually tries to build the “genetic connection” into social policy. Af-
ter the “founders” of the society devised in the original position have passed away, suc-
cessive states will transfer wealth across generations through a public agent.
　Furthermore, argues Epstein, “the ordinary rules of property, contract and tort, en-
forced by a limited government subject to stringent eminent domain restrictions” are 
the best means to ensure the wealth of future generations.（44） Each newborn is endowed 
with particular abilities enabling her to perform labor, the fruits of which are hers, and 
the possession of which had not been taken away from a previous generation. Epstein 
assumes that any inequalities that arise will be tempered with charitable donations and 
welfare programs “without regard to the age of the payers and recipients.”（45） He de-
scribes his position on intergenerational justice as a “leave-bad-enough-alone” attitude 
that is better than the alternatives, nonetheless. This libertarian position assumes away 
（42）　Ibid.
（43）　Ibid., p.90
（44）　Ibid., p.101
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a role for the state in achieving justice across generations as less efficient than individ-
uals.
　To summarize the paper to this point: Following Peter Laslett’s lead, I suggest that 
social contract doctrine cannot provide the strongest argument for justice across gener-
ations. Social contract theory imposes, but fails to inspire individuals to feel, an obliga-
tion to those not yet born, and demands an obligation to those ahead of us in the tem-
poral procession, where there is none. Because Rawls relies on contract doctrine, he 
has to interfere with the level of ignorance of parties in the original position as well as 
assume they will accept a contractual obligation to those who precede them in time. 
This demand is based on an appeal to traditional family obligation and highlights the 
inappropriateness of contractarian thinking, which is now vulnerable to the libertarian 
argument from Epstein to remove the state and leave intergenerational justice in the 
hands of the family.
　On the matter of distributive justice for the elderly, the instrument of a trust not only 
accurately describes the manner in which public pension program operate, but also bet-
ter captures the relationship between the parties who participate in the trust. As an 
analogy to a “collective determination” to preserve our institutions and other social 
goods- such as the environment- for future generations, the trust is more effective than 
the contract as it releases individuals from the imposition of unrealistic duties.
To achieve justice across generations, for the elderly and for the not yet born, the trust 
is a better instrument than the social contract.
　The purpose of the trust is to ensure that we may reasonably expect the means to 
pursue our own projects after we are forced to leave the market, either due to age-relat-
ed disability or forced retirement. After all, absent a retirement benefit of some type, 
the longer we live beyond the last paycheck we receive, the greater our likelihood of 
becoming poor. ＊A libertarian might object that we could achieve the same goals by 
（45）　Ibid., p.102
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mandating that all individuals set aside some percentage of their salary for investment 
in a privately managed fund. The government of Chile, for example, privatized its pen-
sion system and requires workers to designate one fund, from a list of state-approved 
funds, into which a portion of their paychecks should be transferred.（46） This option re-
quires coercion, though, and not just for political reasons, i.e. to overcome collective 
action problems, but for moral ones, as well, to ensure people have the means to pursue 
their own projects as self-owners.
　An individual who chooses not to prepare for her retirement will violate her own 
moral capacity if she becomes destitute in her old age, and she will violate others’ self-
ownership rights if she receives a pension from them without ever having paid contri-
butions into the fund. It is against this latter possibility that the libertarian has an incen-
tive to make sure everyone contributes to the fund. Libertarians either advocate the 
provision of funding for the elderly or they are callous enough to tolerate those without 
a retirement income source or charity die homeless in their old age. （At which point 
the libertarian may have to make a cold calculation: Will the expense of disposing of 
the bodies of these tragic cases be less than the expense of preserving an expanding 
fund for retirement?） We must either tolerate the public spectacle of homeless elderly 
dying slow, painful deaths or concede some violation of the entitlement theory as insur-
ance against such a scenario. The libertarian has to tolerate coerced participation in pri-
vate funds or in a publicly managed fund. The case against any coercion on this matter 
＊　I will not address the issue of forced retirement here but am ready to concede to the libertarian that the 
public agent should not necessarily require anyone to leave the workforce earlier than they wish. In fact, 
their presence arguably benefits the pension trust fund as the “working elderly” delay claims on it while 
continuing to work. The operative words for now are “not necessarily.”  High numbers of elderly people in 
the workforce will affect on the available number of jobs available for the young as well as their salaries, 
among other things, though the nature and degree of these affects depends partly on the demographic 
balance of the population.
（46）　For a comprehensive, if not exhaustive, list of sources praising this system, consider typing the words 
“Chileʼs pension system” into the search engine of the Website for the libertarian Cato Institute, www.cato.
org
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fails and the trust fund is the best means to provide a pension.
　The trust fund, as noted above, replaces the artificial contract claim with an expecta-
tion of trust between citizens in similar age cohorts. This latter, for reasons celebrated 
by libertarians, is the more effective basis for appeal. People do relate more readily to 
people who share their status and age （say, being in oneʼs thirties and working） than 
with those removed in time and place （from the perspective of a 35-year old a retiree is 
far away in both qualities） and the notion of a duty to not yet born strangers asks for 
our loyalty to an abstraction. The appeal of contributing to a fund that will return bene-
fits to us- as a particular cohort- is more convincing than an appeal to a filial duty to 
millions of strangers. As Laslett demonstrates, we can posit no contract from familial 
relations. We cannot, therefore, posit a contract that makes an analogous appeal to fa-
milial relations, e.g. the claim that pension contributions are a collective duty to our 
parents’ and grandparents’ generations.
　As for justice for those not yet born, my argument hinges more on perspective and 
scope than on substance at this point, but its implications are broad. I agree with Rawls 
and Burke that any democratic society should wish to transfer the fruits of its laws and 
culture to future generations in order to guarantee for the not-yet-born the means to re-
alize their own projects as well as to innovate. The contract doctrine does not convince 
us to do so, however. If it is impossible on logical and psychological grounds to bind 
us to our immediate predecessors, then it is even more so for those further removed 
from us in the generational procession. It requires the absurdity of accepting that each 
of us owe something to those not yet born. Rawls wishes us to set aside a fund for the 
social minimum, in addition to preserve cultural artifacts. But, I propose the fund anal-
ogy is best, again. First, as the public agent is tasked with expanding the pension fund, 
that will persist into the future as a benefit for the not yet born. Second, laws, culture 
and even the environment, may be passed on through existing means such as the fami-
ly, a constitution, universities, museums, a myriad of non-governmental organizations, 
etc. My position diverges from the libertarians on the matter of allowing the state to 
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play any distributive role. Thus far I have conceded a certain compatibility with my ar-
gument for the trust fund and a minimal state. This concession has been easy to make 
because once the door for some intervention is open, the matter of justice across gener-
ations is political- which is not to say the politics of it do not proceed from a carefully 
considered moral position. After the contract doctrine has been abandoned, and re-
placed with the trust fund doctrine, we may pick up an outdated notion as a project for 
political theory- the nurturing of the individual to be a citizen of a liberal, democratic 
state. As James S. Fishkin observes shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, “Lib-
eral theory has seemed almost to assume that atomic individuals spring from nowhere 
into adulthood only to return, eventually to the void.“（47） The future of a democratic so-
ciety is not a void but the heir to the justice of the present. This project is one that 
should be embraced, and contested over, between progressives and conservatives, but it 
is one that democratic societies should facilitate.
―H. Steven Green・法学部准教授―
（47）　James S. Fishkin, “The Limits of Intergenerational Justice,” in Fishkin and Laslett, p. 62
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